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At the earliest stages of the GCC’s recent economic growth, a consultant and journalist, 
Michael Field, traveled to the Arabian Peninsula. He then wrote about his experience in 
his 1984 book “the Merchants, The Big Business Families of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf 
States.”  A keen observer of socioeconomic structures, Field wrote: “[T]he merchant 
families are part of the Arabian establishment. They dominate Arabian commercial life 
and they have been responsible for as many economic innovations as the governments. 
They have established most of the new Arabian investment banks, light industries and 
high technology service companies. In the Gulf States, which have a tradition as trading 
communities, the merchants are the most valued constituents of the ruling families; their 
senior members are consulted on most important domestic political issues. In both 
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states the merchants serve the ruling families in 
government.” (Field, 1984, P.11) 
 
In this paper, I provide an overview of the dynamics within the current structure of 
capital accumulation in the GCC. One integral part of these dynamics has been the evolution of 
the relationship between Western powers, mainly the U.S. and the U.K, with the GCC states. 
Therefore, I use the first section of this research to examine the strategies adapted by Western 
powers in dealing with the GCC states and the emerging role of GCC transnational elites, and 
some of the reasons and interests behind these strategies. The second component of this analysis 
deals with the domestic setting of the GCC states in order to explore the other side of the 
structure of capital accumulation as well as the role and characteristics of the GCC transnational 
elites. 
 Much of the literature on the Middle East focuses on either institutional arrangements or 
culture.  There have been few attempts to analyze the relationships that Middle Eastern political 
and economic elites have developed with global elite networks.  This work represents a 
significant departure from contemporary scholarship by analyzing the extent to which Middle 
Eastern elites within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are linked to the Transnational 
Capitalist Class (TCC) in the rest of the world economy.  The transnational capitalist class (TCC) 
is composed of actors who derive their wealth and power from ownership of production or 
financial activities on a global scale. Indeed, the argument advanced here is that Middle Eastern 
elites have been integrated within a global transnational class that has disproportionate power 
and influence within the world system. on the other hand, this global structure of accumulation is 
tied to the maintenance of a repressive state apparatus in the GCC. 
In contrast to mainstream claims, in the GCC little evidence seems to exist showing that a 
greater level of economic integration has led to greater domestic freedoms. In other words, 
political coercion in the Middle East is central to global capitalist profits and the social structure 
of accumulation in this phase of global capitalism in particular. Arguably, the TCC has grown 
more dependent on authoritarian institutions and centralized governance in the Middle East over 
time.  Thus, economic liberalization does not equate to political liberalization but instead 
sometimes requires its opposite (i.e. authoritarian structures that provide maximum space for 
transnational class interests to profit). Accordingly, greater integration of the Persian Gulf Arab 
states into the global economy and the removal of trade barriers have solidified the position of 
the regional transnational elites, which in turn has stabilized authoritarian regimes in the sub-
region. 
 The issue of stability of the sub-region’s monarchies is worth closer attention. Generally 
speaking, global capital has increasingly viewed the maintenance of the status quo in the Persian 
Gulf sub-region as a primary concern. In the words of Adam Hanieh, a key strategy of global 
capital has been “prioritizing the status quo and seeking to block any possibility of regime 
change” (Hanieh, 2011, P.176). This is not surprising given the conventionally accepted notion 
that capital often seeks security, without much concern about what the source of that security 
may be. The more-than-accidental relationship between the authoritarian status quo in the 
Persian Gulf sub-region and the highly globalized economic systems of this sub-region is a 
serious challenge to the neo-liberal account of global dynamics.  Table 1 below helps to illustrate 
the seemingly paradoxical situation in the Persian Gulf sub-region, if one is to accept the neo-
liberal perspective. 
 
Country 
Economic 
Freedom 
Index Ranking PR CL  Status 
Average of 
CL and PR  
Oman 68.1 45 6 5 NF 5.5 
Qatar 71.3 27 6 5 NF 5.5 
Saudi 
Arabia 60.6 82 
7 7 NF 7 
Kuwait 63.1 66 5 5 PF 5 
UAE 71.1 28 6 6 NF 6 
Bahrain 75.5 12 6 6 NF 6 
GCC 68.28 
 
 6 5.6  NF 5.8 
 
Table 1: Freedom Status of GCC states  
(PR: Political Right, CL: Civil Liberty, NF: Not Free, PF: Partly FREE) 
Source: Freedom House and the Heritage Foundation, 2013 
 
In the Freedom House categorization, when a freedom rating for a country is between 5.5 
to 7.0, the country is considered as “Not Free”. According to Table 1, the status of Persian Gulf 
Arab states are among the top 25 percent of “Not Free” countries. On the other hand, with the 
average Economic Freedom Index of 68.28, these countries are among the top 25 percent of the 
world’s free economies. It may be added that Polity IV Project also categorizes the sub-region's 
six monarchies as autocracies (rather than constitutional monarchies). 
As for the issue of stability, Table 2 provides the Failed State Index for all the countries 
within the GCC. The Failed State Index is often relied on as a relatively accurate indicator of the 
level of stability in various countries. In 2012, this Index was measured for 178 countries “based 
on their levels of stability and the pressures they face”. (The Fund for Peace, 2012, P.3)  
 
 
 
 
 
 Country 
Failed State 
Index Ranking 
Oman 51.7 137 
Qatar 48 142 
Saudi Arabia 73.4 100 
Kuwait 58.8 128 
UAE 48.9 140 
Bahrain 62.2 125 
GCC 57.16 
  
Table 2: Level of Stability in GCC states 
Source: www.failedstatesindex.org, 2012 
 
 
According to Table 2, the Persian Gulf Arab states are among the top 27 percent of the 
most stable countries in the world (where the lower rank means more stability). The high level of 
stability holds true today, even despite the recent “Arab spring”, which has shaken the 
sociopolitical structure in the rest of the Arab world. To better grasp the significance of stability 
within the GCC, it is useful to consider the immediate neighbors of the GCC members and how 
they score when it comes to stability.  Table 3 provides the figures based on the same Failed 
State Index. According to these numbers, the rest of the Middle East is among the 20 percent 
most unstable countries in the world.  
 
 
Country 
Failed State 
Index Ranking 
Egypt 90.4 31 
Iran 89.6 34 
Cyprus 66.8 115 
Iraq 104.3 9 
Israel/West Bank 82.2 61 
Jordan 74.8 90 
Lebanon 85.8 45 
Syria 94.5 23 
 Turkey 76.6 85 
Yemen 104.8 8 
Average 89.98 
  
Table 3: The Level of Stability in the rest of Middle Eastern States 
Source: www.failedstatesindex.org, 2012 
 
Arguably, one of the outstanding questions when it comes to the nature of these 
authoritarian regimes is how they have managed to juxtapose a traditional ruling system with 
certain forces of modernization that are often considered as causes of instability in non-
democratic regimes. Many authors and commentators have correctly paid attention to the 
domestic factors leading to the considerable level of stability in these six countries. Yet, the 
picture remains incomplete unless one takes into account the international factors, which are 
often channeled through the transnational elites 
 
The Historical Evolution 
 
Many major world powers have long identified the GCC as an important geostrategic 
location. Great powers have also sought to carve out new markets for themselves as well as to 
control important trade and military routes throughout this region. For example, “the principal 
impetus for initial British entry into the Gulf was a combination of a search for markets and an 
effort to deny European rivals supremacy in the region” (P.278, Potter, 2009). In fact, the Persian 
Gulf and its Arab states have long been among the most significant geostrategic regions for great 
powers. Beginning with the early sixteenth century, for around two centuries, the Persian Gulf 
was part of “Portugal’s Asian Empire” (P.208, Potter, 2009). The geostrategic appeal of the 
region along with the economic interests in finding new markets attracted the Dutch and the 
Ottomans as well. More recently, the context of the great power competition in the Middle East 
has changed from a colonial to a post-colonial one. Even more recently, the post-colonial 
intrusion of great powers into the region has been shaped by a globalization of the transnational 
capital, in which, “a key aspect in the globalization is transnational class formation” (Robinson, 
2001, P.533). 
Following the demise of classical imperialism, and during the post-colonial era, the 
legacy of imperialism has reemerged in various informal economic activities. A key feature of 
these economic activities is that they “are not regulated, monitored or controlled directly or 
indirectly by the states”(Routh, 2011, P.211). Such informal economic activities, partly 
facilitated by a series of international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Trade Organization (WTO), have accelerated new patterns of structural 
involvements of the great powers in other regions’ affairs. In the past few decades, arguably the 
most noticeable economic structure that “informal imperialism” has manifested in its various 
political, social and economic aspects has been the “transnational space”. Under the currently 
mainstream process of capitalization, the transnational space has appeared as the most 
preferential climate for transnational capital –i.e. “[t]he hegemonic fraction of capital in a world 
scale” (Robinson, 2003, P.39). This space also lends itself quite well to the informal economic 
activities, and especially those that rely on cheap labor and raw materials.   
 In the Persian Gulf, Great Britain has been the pioneer among the great powers that paid 
attention to the significance of local elites for its imperialist goals in the region. This is one of the 
reasons that decades after the apparent end of the British colonial presence in the region, that 
country still exerts a strong influence on almost all of the smaller Persian Gulf Arab states. From 
the earlier stages of the British imperialism, the British designed the structure of their 
relationship with the “protected” states of the GCC in such a way that informal imperialism was 
embedded in the GCC elites: 
 
“[w]hen Britain thought it necessary to replace a sitting shaikh, it preferred to work 
behind the scenes and within the ruling family. In 1923, Britain forced the abdication of 
Shaikh Isa b. Ali Al Khalifa in Bahrain and his replacement by his son Hamad b. Isa in 
order to institute what it believed to be long-overdue reforms in the country. In 1965, 
members of the ruling Qawasim family in Sharjah were encouraged to depose Shaikh 
Saqr b. Sultan, a thorn in the British side because of his admiration for pan-Arab 
nationalism and ties to Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Arab League. In 1966, Britain 
prodded Shaikh Zayid b. Sultan Al Nahyan to remove his long-serving brother 
Shakhbut, who was clearly unsuitable to govern an oil-era state. In 1970, Britain 
encouraged young Sayyid Qabus b. Sa‘id to overthrow his father as Sultan of Oman” 
(Potter, P.283, 2008). 
 
In the early 1970s, after the Great Britain reduced its military and security engagement in 
the Persian Gulf, the U.S. began to fill the vacuum. In particular, the U.S. wanted to rely on 
surrogates (or “key allies”) to ensure that oil would be delivered to the West in an uninterrupted 
manner. Iran and, to a lesser extent, Saudi Arabia played the role of key regional allies for the 
U.S. That arrangement did not last, however, due to the political changes in Iran and the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979 (Potter, P.295, 2008). Following the Iranian Revolution, for the first-time the 
U.S. announced that it would use its own armed forces to protect the “global” (i.e. the West’s) 
access to oil, instead of relying on the allies in the region. This was a major strategic change for 
the U.S. and for the region as well. The policy is known as the Carter Doctrine. President Carter 
chose these words in explaining the new American strategy vis-à-vis the region: “Let our 
position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf 
region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and 
such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force” (Stoles, 2010, 
P.27). The Carter Doctrine paved the way for the contemporary mode of American militarism in 
the region; and due to the connection to oil from the outset, the Doctrine is closely tied to the 
deeper integration of the region into the global economy.  Therefore, the Carter Doctrine could 
be viewed as a dividing line, which marks the deeper integration of the region into the globalized 
structure of transnational production. This was a fit to the familiar pattern in oil-rich regions in 
global south, where “transnationalizaiton is bolstered by militarization” (Stokes, 2010, P.3). Not 
surprisingly, the combination of American strategy and the GCC’s acquiescence with it has led 
to the repeated use of force and the strong presence of repressive state apparatus in the GCC 
region.  
Following the implementation of the Carter Doctrine, the level of integration between the 
West and the Persian Gulf region –with the important exception of Iran– has increased 
dramatically. Subsequently, the nature of the integration has shifted from international ties to 
transnational ties. In other words, there has been a deepening of military, economic and social 
 ties between the two sides that took place before the end of the Cold War. Even though the end 
of the Cold War has often been seen as a more dramatic transformation toward further 
transnationalization, the GCC region had already well advanced in transnationalization when the 
Soviet Union collapsed. Nevertheless, the transformation expedited after the collapse, partly due 
to the very fact that the Soviet Union no longer existed in the 1990s. On the other hand, after the 
long-term suppression of the leftist and nationalist movements, there were no significant 
domestic voices that would call for regulation of capital so that local socio-economic structures 
could emerge. This suppression of anti-capitalist voices in the region had been supported long 
before even the Iranian Revolution by western military powers. In fact, as an element of the 
Carter Doctrine, the Rapid Development Force (RDF) was formed in order to protect the U.S. 
interests in the region and to fight against any threats to those interests. The most notable threats 
that were identified and targeted by RDF were the leftists and nationalists movements that had 
the potential to bring about a regime change (Stokes, 2010, P.91). To counter such movements, 
generous military supports were offered to the ruling elites. For instance, Saudi Arabia, the most 
powerful GCC state, has remained as “one of the least free countries in the world, with political 
and economic power held by a very small ruling elite. Because this rule largely rests upon 
American military support and such support is contingent upon the free flow of oil, U.S. and 
Saudi interests have remained deeply entwined throughout the postwar era” (Stokes, 2010, P.88).  
Throughout the process of transnationalizaiotn of capital, an emerging tendency appears 
to be creating local elites that have fewer and fewer ties with domestic institutions. In this 
context, the ruling legitimacy will gradually decline while the “citizenry are becoming 
effectively non-sovereign”(Mair, 2006, P.25). It is, in fact, the nature of transnational 
globalization that creates non-sovereign citizenry along with transnational rulers. Thus, it is not 
surprising that the resulting delegitimized elites need to be protected by the use of force given 
potential socioeconomic unrest that ensue such an unstable state-society relationship. As a result 
of this scheme, the U.S. continues “to put significant effort into protecting the region’s oil 
infrastructure and bolstering the capacities of pro-US elites to stabilize their respective territories 
and repress challenges to U.S. interests” (Stokes, 2010, P.100).  
To summarize, as a consequence of both deepening economic integration and geopolitical 
calculations, the role of the Persian Gulf –both as a region and as a collection of states– in 
shaping global power balance within capitalism remains crucial today. The economic decision of 
the GCC states in regard to other countries (e.g. in the areas of foreign trade and investment) has 
also added to the complexities. For instance, the economic rivalry between the U.S. and China in 
acquiring more and more economic benefits from the region has become an integral part any 
economic and geopolitical analysis of the region. Thus, there are two dimensions: first is the 
GCC states’ own economic decisions and behavior; second is the international economic context 
of those decisions and behaviors. In the following section I will discuss how the GCC states’ 
economic behavior has evolved toward transnational economic activities, heavily influenced by 
the transnational capitalist principles.  
 
The Emergence of a GCC Transnational Elite 
 
Historically, the capitalist economic structure of the GCC states has been developed 
through the particular transnational ties between the GCC and the rest of the world economy. In 
order to investigate the nature and impact of transnational economic interactions between 
Western powers and the GCC states and the evolution of these interactions, it is important to pay 
 attention to the essential characteristics of the very institution of “state” in the GCC countries. In 
fact, the influences of old and well-established commercial merchant families have been quite 
significant in the political hierarchies of the region from the before the foundation of modern 
states in the Arabian Peninsula. In terms of the historical structure of the societies  and that of 
politics, Lawrence Potter observes that the “tribes were the key to forming modern states in the 
Arabian Peninsula, and the dynasties presently ruling there are all of tribal origin” (P.2, Potter, 
2009).These tribes were originated based on family and blood ties. The resulting political 
structure has been what Field observed some three decades ago about the significant role of 
merchants as important actors in ruling “families”. As a result, important families and influential 
wealthy individuals in these families have become the most significant actors in the interactions 
between the West and the GCC states. Many of these families have been both merchants and 
rulers at the same time. For the most part, the merchant-ruler combination applies to most GCC 
ruling families today. On the other hand, unlike many other monarchies where the ruling family 
came to  power by controlling a pre-existing state, the GCC ruling families themselves created 
the very institutions comprising the modern state over which they reign.  Accordingly, there is a 
quite blurred line between the institution of “royal family” and that of “state” in the GCC 
countries. On the other hand, the mode of GCC governance appears to offer a modern/traditional 
dichotomy-i.e. a modern state with  tribal origins. This dichotomy has manifested in numerous 
ways in the process of capital accumulation. In particular, the dichotomy provides gaps and 
“breathing spaces” that facilitate the emergence of the GCC-based transnational elites. 
One of the central arguments presented in this paper is that the roles played by the 
transnational elites of the GCC are crucial in analyzing socio-economic and geopolitics of this 
region.  The GCC elites, almost all of whom coming from politically influential and 
economically wealthy families, are by far the most important agents in the political economy of 
the GCC. During the past few decades they have also become important players in global 
structure of capital accumulation. The GCC elites are directly connected to transnational 
economic activities as a “class-in-itself”, meaning that these elites are important to facilitating 
the global accumulation of profits. In other words, in modern times, the relationship between the 
western powers and the GCC states has been contextualized in the development of global 
capitalism and the current pattern of globalization of transnational capital; the relationship 
resembles that of inter-corporate –rather than inter-national– affairs highly influenced by the 
struggles within the Transnational Capitalist Class (TCC). It may be added that “[g]lobal 
capitalism is not a collection of ‘national’ economies but the suppression through transnational 
integration of ‘national’ economies understood as autonomous entities related through external 
exchanges to other such entities”  (Robinson, 2001, P.533).  However, the GCC transnational 
elites have penetrated the process of decision-making to the extent that the class is politically 
subordinate to the TCC. 
It is common among many scholars who work on the GCC that they consider the GCC 
elites as nationally- and/or internationally-oriented actors. It is perhaps true that, at the 
beginning, the “elites” in the Arabian Peninsula had been internationally oriented . During the 
past two decades, however, any inter-national characteristic of these elites has dramatically 
changed towards “transnationally oriented” elites. Arguably, what ushered in this new trans-
national character of the GCC elites was the role of oil and its commercialization in the region. 
Natural resources such as oil have existed for a long time in this region; and its existence 
and the ability of the local GCC elites to profit from its exploitation goes back to the time when 
these elites were international elites. What has happened more recently, however, is that the 
 GCC elites have developed a much more embedded relationship with the global TCC through 
such arrangements as expanded investment linkages (especially in finance and oil).  Therefore, 
these elites no longer simply function as reliable producers of oil that is sold in the world 
markets. Instead, the GCC elites are the key piece of an oil production and financial supply chain 
that renders them as partners with Western TCC firms. Nevertheless, one of the most significant 
characteristics of these elites remains the fact that they have emerged throughout oil-based 
economic activities.  
The emergence of transnational actors in the GCC region is not a phenomenon that 
happened in isolation from the general process of transnational globalization. Neither has it been 
separated from the particular development of transnationalization that has taken place in the 
Persian Gulf. In terms of transnational globalization, it appears necessary to analyze the concept 
based on transnational practices (TNPs), i.e. practices that different actors (including states) are 
engaged in throughout the process of globalization. Understanding of the notion of transnational 
globalization is crucial in analyzing the GCC. Elaborating this conception of globalization, Sklair 
writes: 
 
“The transnational conception of globalization postulates the existence of a global 
system. Its basic units of analysis are transnational practices (TNP), practices that cross 
state boundaries but do not originate with state agencies or actors. Analytically, TNPs 
operate in three spheres, the economic, the political, and the cultural-ideological. The 
whole is the global system. While the global system is not synonymous with global 
capitalism, what the theory sets out to demonstrate is that the dominant forces of global 
capitalism are the dominant forces in the contemporary global system” (P.69, Sklair, 
2000). 
 
Increasingly, the GCC economy has been steered toward transnationalization with the 
significant role of transnational practices (TNP) within this region. Transnational practices are 
the “practices that cross state boundaries but do not necessarily originate with state agencies or 
actors” (P.2, Sklair, 1998). For structural reasons, TCC interests are tied to transnational 
practices rather than to local economic activities. A significant part of the political economy of 
the GCC countries is based on the economic activities of TNCs, rather than any domestic or 
national industrial, high-tech or service sections. The direct link between the GCC states and 
TCC is, therefore, obvious, as it is the members of TCC that control transnational corporations 
and TNPs. On the other hand, TCC has to exert more and more power on national institutions in 
order to protect and enhance its role and interests.  
The GCC states continue to play a significant role in the process of transnationalization. 
Under the process of transnational globalization, understanding the dynamics within states and 
state institutions in these countries is crucial for our purpose. In particular, in order to properly 
understand the extent and the nature of TNPs in the GCC, one must pay attention to the notion of 
“Transnational State”. Robinson offers three (interrelated) propositions for the concept of state 
based on “historical materialist conception of state”: 
 
“1) economic globalization has its counterpart in transnational class formation and in 
the emergence of a transnational state (henceforth, TNS) that has been brought into 
existence to function as the collective authority for a global ruling class; 2) the nation-
state is neither retaining its primacy nor disappearing but becoming transformed and 
 absorbed into this larger structure of a TNS; 3) this emergent TNS institutionalizes a 
new class relation between global capital and global labor” (P.158, Robinson, 2001). 
 
The transnationalization that has taken place in the GCC region relies on three historical 
facts. The first is that enormous oil and gas resources, which in turn have invited a host of 
transnational corporations to this region, have led the political economy of the GCC to be 
shaped, to its very core, by transnational practices. This is to the extent that demarcating 
“national” economies in this region has become an extremely difficult –if not impossible– task. 
The “transnationalization” has occurred in two (related) directions. First, there are the 
transnational practices by outside entities in the GCC region, and second, there are the 
transnational practices of the GCC elites in other regions of the world. Meanwhile, and as the 
political economy of the GCC has been increasingly shaped by TNPs, so has its economic 
culture. The notions of production, wealth, economic activity, profit, labor and capital as well as 
social justice are understood (or ignored), therefore, from the perspective of TNPs. 
Second is the fact that religious extremism became a major source for the legitimization 
of the ruling families. In the early 1960s, the World Muslim League (WML), and, even most 
importantly, King Faysal, then-ruler of Saudi Arabia, came to the conclusion that nationalism 
and socialism along with secularism were significant threats to Islam. As a result, religion 
emerged as a significant instrument at the disposal of the state to suppress anti-capitalist voices. 
Accordingly, the nationalism of the Nasser era gradually gave way to various forms of pan-
Islamism (Prashad, 2008, P.260, 261). Therefore, only those conceptualizations of nationalism 
that weaved in the strong elements of religion could bring some degree of legitimacy for the 
GCC capitalist classes in the task of justifying their rule over their traditional societies. Such 
conceptualizations could, therefore, remove many domestic obstacles in the way of 
establishment of capitalist principles that were necessary for global capital accumulation. 
Third is the historical formation of a new set of class relations. Some four decades ago, 
Fred Holiday had predicted the collapse of these authoritarian regimes due to the exploitive 
economic relations that would trigger high level of dissatisfaction among the lower classes in 
these six states. This prediction, however, did not materialize. This is mainly because of the later 
stage of the formation of current class relations. The current nature of the working class in these 
states appears to be much more complicated than what the classical framework of analysis allows 
for.  
In all GCC countries, a relatively high percentage of the population consists of foreign 
working class who do not have any political voices whatsoever. These foreign workers often 
have no stable living condition, social security or economic perspective. As a consequence the 
neoliberal labour politics that has been adopted by GCC states had led to the emergence of 
transnational labour class. In fact, the emergence of transnational labour class could assist GCC-
based capitalist class to defuse the pressure they might receive from local labour. This would 
insulate the state against a domestic pressure that could redirect the economic structure towards 
national objectives rather than TNPs’ goals.      
At the same time, in none of these countries the Huntingtonian prediction of the middle 
class as the engine of socioeconomic change has been realized. Indeed, a general analysis of the 
middle class is rarely an accurate way to identify the characteristics of society and to predict its 
behavior. For instance, in terms of literacy, which is a major theme in analyzing the middle class, 
there are many factors that can contextualize the process of education. These factors impact the 
resulting middle class and the direction and strength of the “political will” they would wield to 
 bring about democratic changes. The difficulty with general middle-class analyses arises, in part, 
from the lack of accurate measurement indicia. For instance, it is unclear what level of schooling 
and college education in the GCC would be sufficient to create a viable push for democratic 
processed. On the other hand, in these countries it appears that the middle classes, by and large, 
consider their economic well being as dependent upon the ruling class. The GCC middle classes 
heavily depend on the rent channels that are provided and sustained by the royal families to 
maintain the status quo. This structure has been put in place over many past decades. 
As a result, high percentage of indigenous people in the GCC “increasingly being 
distanced from the forces of production and thus sidelined into becoming a rentier class 
dependent on government subsidies, rather than a distinct proletariat or middle class” (P.6, 
Davidson, 2013). This phenomenon, of course, has been contextualized within a global context 
in which “TNS seeks to create and maintain the pre-conditions for the valorization and 
accumulation of capital in the global economy, which is not simply the sum of national 
economies and national class structures and requires a centralized authority to represent the 
whole of competing capitals, the major combinations of which are no longer "national" capitals”. 
(Robinson, P.167, 2001) 
The renting channels that are controlled by the GCC transnational elites could bring 
about a new class formation through a series of what I call “semi-redistribution policies”. I use 
the term “semi-redistribution” because of the very fact that such policies have not decreased the 
gap among social classes in any notable way. As result, we may refer to the GCC states as 
‘transnational rentier states’. This term refers to the political context in which these states have 
been transnationalized. The term also indicates the fact that, due to the rentier nature of the 
states, societies are prone to be subjugated to the decisions of the elites, including those decisions 
aimed at further transnationalizaiton. 
 
GCC Transnational Space 
 
In the following sections of the paper I aim to explain the “GCC transnational space” that 
has been promoted by the GCC-based transnational elites and TCC. To do so, it is necessary to 
understand the major components of this transnational space. The first is the GCC Sovereign 
Wealth Fund (SWFs) that are significant financial institutions (reliable sources for TNPs) 
controlled by royal families. The second institution is GCC educational system that is heavily 
influenced by capitalist principles. Finally, the third major component of the analysis in this 
section is the GCC labour market.  
 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) 
 
The first significant institution is Sovereign Wealth Fund. According to the International 
Working Group (IWG) of Sovereign Wealth Funds, SWF could be defined as “special-purpose 
investment funds or arrangements that are owned by the general government. Created by the 
general government for macro-economic purposes, SWFs hold, manage, or administer assets to 
achieve financial objectives, and employ a set of investment strategies that include investing in 
foreign financial assets” (P.49, Sultan and etc, 2012).  
The GCC-based SWFs is arguably a clear manifestation of the “super national economic 
and political institutions that begin to acquire the characteristics of a transnational state” 
(Robinson, 2001, P.533). In GCC, the empirical evidence indicates that the conventional 
 explanations of SWF may be misleading. First and foremost, the process of decision-making in 
the GCC-SWFs transactions is by and large limited to the royal families. On the other hand, the 
way that SWFs’ presence are formulated is that SWFs are to improve national economies by 
preventing the Dutch Disease or by preserving the benefits of natural resources for the future 
generations (e.g. through the use of the proceeds from those resources in improving the 
economic infrastructures of the country). In GCC, however, it is not clear that how much these 
funds engage in infrastructural development. This ambiguity arises in part from the fact that 
“they publish no accounts, provide inconsistent aggregate asset figures to the media, and say 
nothing about their investment strategies.”[In addition to] these funds made a “very public 
contribution to propping up ailing U.S. banks during the acute phase of the 2008 global financial 
crisis” (Schwartz, 2012, P.519). Meanwhile, the Persian Gulf Arab states’ SWFs are controlled 
by individual actors rather than public entities. As a result of this model of management, these 
funds appear to have become an important sources of capital for personal investments. Table 4 
provides some basic information on significant SWFs in the GCC region that illustrate the 
enormous financial capacity of the GCC-based SWFs. 
 
 
 
Country Sovereign Fund Name 
Assets as of 
2012 (in Billion 
$) 
Inception Origin 
UAE- Abu 
Dhabi 
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 627 1976 Oil 
Saudi Arabia SAMA Foreign Holdings 532.8 n/a Oil 
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority 296 1953 Oil 
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority 100 2005 Oil 
UAE- Dubai Investment Corporation of Dubai 70 2006 Oil 
UAE-Abu 
Dhabi 
International Petroleum Investment Company 58 1984 Oil 
UAE-Abu 
Dhabi 
Mubadala Development Company 48.2 2002 Oil 
Bahrain Mumtalakat Holdings 9.1 2006 Non-commodity 
Oman State General Reserve Fund 8.2 1980 Oil & Gas 
 
Table 4: The GCC Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) 
Source: SWF Asset Allocation Report 2012, Conducted by Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, Inc. 
 
 
GCC-based SWFs are playing a crucial role in trasnsnationalization of capital and 
(re)consolidation of the GCC transnational elites’ power in TCC. For instance, according to the 
book, New Post-Oil Arab Gulf: 
 
“KIA [Kuwait Investment Authority], which was established in 1953, is well known on 
the international scene, for its 7.1 percent stake in Daimler Chrysler dating back to 1969 
and its 3.3 percent share in British Petroleum (BP). More recently, KIA made headlines 
 by becoming the largest investor in the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China ($720 
million) in 2006, followed by a combined $5 billion investment in Citigroup and Merrill 
Lynch in late 2007/early 2008, among other investments.” (P.55, Sultan, 2012) 
 
Interestingly, the mainstream centers of the transnational capitalist class have applauded 
the GCC states’ economic policies. According to an article produced in 1997 by the Middle 
Eastern Department of IMF: “The GCC countries have already completed most of the crucial 
stages of liberalization and financial reform”. This liberalization was succeeded by creation of 
many SWFs in the GCC that play an important role in returning petrodollars into the global 
financial market and by reinvesting it in mostly western countries. At the same time, these funds 
have appeared as the reliable sources of capital for many GCC-based financial sectors. These 
financial sectors can play a decisive role in financing the private sector of global economy by 
injecting large sums of cash into the system, mainly during the periods of financial crisis such as 
the 2008 crisis. Furthermore, the position of the GCC elites in the TCC has been strengthened by 
the segmentation of production according to neoliberalism. The GCC elites play a significant 
role in the global economy of oil and the financial transactions of petrodollars. 
 
GCC Segmented Education System: 
 
The Second Important institution is Education. The education system is not only 
important as an institution itself. It is also a good case to study that manifests the class relations 
in a transnationally oriented structure of GCC. On the one hand, many of the GCC elites are 
educated in top ranking private schools and colleges in the West. This is not surprising as the 
TCC members have “similar life styles”, including the “pattern of higher education” (Sklair, 
2000). On the other hand, the GCC states embarked on ambitious educational programs that 
resulted in the establishment of many western-style schools and universities in the Arabian 
Peninsula. 
It has been argued that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will 
sustain democracy” (P.75, Lipset, 1959). In other words, many scholars of political change 
believe that democracy and economic development have positive correlation with each other. An 
economic development that could lead to industrialization, higher education systems, and 
urbanization can bring stability, which in turn is necessary for democratic system. Despite this 
mainstream theory of democratization, one cannot but notice that solid economic development, 
rapid process of urbanization and dramatic rise in the number of educational institutions in the 
GCC countries have produced the exact opposite result with the authoritarian regimes in this 
region enjoying a high degree of stability.  
The GCC education systems that were originally designed by the TCC is one of the 
reasons behind the survival of repressive state apparatuses in the GCC countries. Arguably, one 
of the most significant aspects of the relationship between the GCC elites and TCC is the 
educational ties between the two, which has led to further cohesion between the two. The 
educational ties link the GCC elite firmly to the “social clubs” embedded within the TCC, while, 
at the same time, they use rents earned from their privileged status to either pay off, repress, or 
ideologically incorporate the majorities of their population.  
The importance of the non-organic educational system in this region cannot be 
overstated. The non-organic educational system that ties the GCC elites to particular educational 
opportunities that are distinct and apart from their societies. This artificially imposed educational 
 system has been embedded and become more and more sophisticated in the past few decades. To 
provide a glimpse into the educational background of the GCC transnational elites, and how that 
background is irrelevant to the history and culture of this region, Table 5 provides some 
information about a number of most influential economic and political figures. 
In terms of the domestic educational system, there are currently plenty of western-style 
schools in these countries. These schools have emerged in parallel with the immigration of many 
western nationals to the GCC for high-paying job opportunities. There are quite a number of 
formal and informal affiliations between Western educational intuitions and the GCC 
educational institutions. A main derive for these formal and informal affiliations appear to have 
been economic advantage to the Western institutions. Table 6 lists some of the western or 
western-style educational institutions in the one of the most globalized cities in the GCC, namely 
Dubai. 
 Table 5: The Educational Background of Major Economic and Political Figures in the GCC1 
Source: (See the Appendix) 
 
                                                                 
1 See the expanded version of Table 5 in appendix  
  
 
 
 
Table 6: Dubai Schools with Western Curricula2 
Source: DubaiFAQs guide to Dubai 
 
 
This phenomenon is not at all limited to Dubai. The spread of non-local educational 
systems in the region is yet another manifestation of the peculiar nature of the state in these six 
countries. Not only the GCC elite have, by and large, received their education from institutions 
that are geared towards the needs and interests of TCC, the local population receive the type of 
education that endorse, and even glorify, the educational background of the ruling elite. It is 
hard, therefore, for a graduate of these domestic western-style institutions to question the 
credibility of ruling elite who is a graduate of Harvard, MIT or the London School of Economics.  
The rise of foreign educational systems in the region coincided with the shift towards 
transnationally oriented economic structures. The only part of the educational system that 
                                                                 
2 See the expanded version of Table 6 in appendix  
School Name  Level Curriculum Qualifications
American International School Dubai  K-12 
Arabic, 
Canadian, US
MOE UAE, US HS 
Diploma
American School of Dubai  K-12 US AP, HS diploma
British National Curriculum School  K-12 UK
Cambridge High School Dubai  K-12 Arabic, UK A-level, IGCSE
Cambridge International School Al Quoz  K-12 UK
Cambridge International School Dubai  K-12 UK A-level, IGCSE
Cambridge International School Dubailand  K-12 UK
Cambridge International School Jumeirah Village  K-12 UK
Collegiate American School  primary US
Common Core 
Standards
Community West First School Dubai  primary UK NC, FS1-Y2
Deans International School  K-12 US AP, SAT
Deira International School  K-12 UK IB, IGCSE
Deira Private School  primary UK NC
Kings College Dubai  K-12 UK NC GCSE, A-Level
Kings School Al Barsha  K-12 UK
Kings School Dubai  primary UK NC FS KS1 KS2
Kings School Nad Al Sheba  K-12 UK EYFS, NC
Latifa School for Girls  K-12 UAE, UK AS, A-level, GCSE
Lycee Francais International Dubai  primary French
Lycee Francais International Georges Pompidou  secondary French
Lycee Francais International Meydan  primary 
Arabic, English, 
French
IB
Lycee Georges Pompidou Ecole primaire Dubai  primary French
Lycee Libanais Francophone Prive  K-12 French
Millfield School Dubai   UK
 remains locally-oriented is formal and informal religious education that indicates the tools used 
by the GCC transnational class to try to gain legitimacy for their rule. The growing chasm 
between these two styles of education has had serious implications in various areas and 
especially in the context of violent extremism in the region –a subject which is beyond the topic 
of this paper. It suffices to say that the “mainstream” educational systems in today’s GCC states 
are more based on a class-based paradigm of development rather than serving as a sustainable 
and organic infrastructure for growth and production of knowledge within the GCC societies. At 
the same time, the impact of western-style educational institutions on these societies remains 
limited. While in certain aspects, such as praise for western technology, these educational 
systems have been quite successful, in other aspects, the GCC societies are quite traditional. This 
creates yet another point of contrast (and friction) with most of the ruling elite, who are often 
immersed in western ethos. 
This kind of educational systems is primarily geared towards enabling and protecting the 
interests of TCC members. As a result, it is not surprising that one may observe in many GCC 
countries what may be called an “institutional dual-personality”. On the one hand, a highly 
modernized and impressively globalized economic system is easily recognizable in these 
countries. On the other hand, a deeply traditional socio-political context that philosophically 
rejects many of the tenants of modernism continues to live beneath modern skyscrapers. The 
tension between traditional and modern perspectives is arguably no greater anywhere than in the 
Muslim world. As Barry Rubin observes, “no area in the world resists-at least explicitly-
globalization to an extent equaling that of the Islamic Middle East” (Rubin, 2003, Yale Global 
Online). Not only globalization but also the so-called “westernization” and modernization have 
been the target of serious criticism by many traditional voices in the Muslim world. At the same 
time, some of the most advanced institutions of modern global economy have taken deep roots in 
this region’s economies and politics to the extent that one may argue this “institutional dual-
personality” is the essence of GCC polities. In such a system, the most the educational systems 
could do is to facilitate upward mobility towards getting closer to the privileged TCC members 
(or what we may call “politics of contiguity” to the sources of power and wealth) rather than 
causing any major structural change in the socio-political status of these states and societies. 
In fact, the GCC’s educational systems are by design at the service of the transnational 
space rather than local economies. Indeed, such educational systems could significantly raise the 
level of literacy within the GCC societies. Yet, this is the type of literacy that is not likely 
conducive to any democratic change; and that is why general middle class analyses and 
assessment of the so-called “democratic indicia” such as literacy do not mean much when it 
comes to these peculiar state-societies (I would like to avoid the term nation-state for two 
reasons: first, the notion of nation in the context of this region is quite problematic and it remains 
doubtful whether nations in the western sense of the term exists there; secondly, in the GCC 
region, states are by far the dominant force compared to the societies. Therefore, I will use the 
term state-society instead of nation-state to refer to these polities). One indication of the 
inefficiency of the existing educational systems in bringing about organic and viable changes is 
the fact that an increasing number of graduates from these educational systems end up migrating 
and seeking job in western countries or in other capitalist economies. This phenomenon is 
precisely due to the fact that these graduates are first and foremost “global citizens” in the sense 
promoted by the mainstream globalization paradigm. They feel much more at home in London 
and New York than they might do in their own societies.  On the other hand, there are significant 
numbers of foreigners who are now enrolling in the GCC schools, both private and public. For 
 instance, “only 15% of the 374 graduates that enrolled at King Abdullah University of Science & 
Technology [a university with one of the largest endowments in the world] were Saudi nationals. 
Similarly, in academic year 2007-08, only 51% of Qatar Education City’s student population 
comprised Qatari nationals as opposed to 70-75% target of the Qatari Foundation” (GCC 
Education Industry, 2010, P.23). This high percentage of foreign enrollment in the educational 
institutions of the region also attests to the fact that these institutions are responsive to the 
educational needs of a “global” –i.e. TCC or TCC aspirant– audience, and not that of the 
indigenous populations. 
It is noticeable that in the same country where one of the most technologically advanced 
universities, i.e. the King Abdullah University of Science & Technology, has been established, 
the anti-West voices are arguably the most vocal. In 2012, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia 
declared “it is necessary to destroy all the churches of the region” (Broomhall, 2012, Arabian 
Business). His declaration may not have much significant consequences in practice especially 
when there is not much freedom of religion to begin with. However, the declaration indicates the 
extreme opposite mentality to the mentality of those Saudi elites who are advocating one of the 
largest transfer of technology in human history from the West to Saudi Arabia. On the other 
hand, as mentioned before, the traditional societies of these states do not seem to be comfortable 
at all with modernization and westernization. A similar experience has been tested and failed in 
Iran during the reign of the Shah, where under a veneer of fast westernization and transfer of 
technology, deeply traditional forces amassed an eventually uncontrollable resentment towards 
the system, which led to the Islamic Revolution of 1979. There is certain level of truth in Rubin’s 
observation that “the two factors that supposedly make globalization attractive are those of 
benefits and cultural synthesis”(Rubin, 2003, Yale Global Online). However, the current pattern 
of globalization, at least in the GCC region, revolves around the benefit to the TCC –rather than 
mutual benefit– and no cultural synthesis. The absence of mutual benefits can be found in some 
statistics reported in an EY study: 
 
“Only 29% of employers feel that education prepares students with necessary technical 
skills and only 19% agree that it prepares young people with the right attitude for 
work…72% of young people stated that parents and family are the primary source of 
information about jobs”. (Perspectives on GCC Youth Employment, 2014, P.5) 
 
The GCC countries offer generous social welfare systems, in which education is free, and 
many other social security benefits are offered. At the same time, these social welfare systems 
are important means for (re)consolidation of the power of the ruling families and for the stability  
of the GCC transnational rentier states. For instance, the accesses to the benefits are not equally 
provided to all. Instead, different citizens, based on their family backgrounds and religions, have 
different levels of access to the government-distributed benefits. This allows the state to channel 
its financial support towards parts of the society that support the royal rule. It is not surprising 
that the welfare systems in these countries are almost completely controlled by the ruling 
families rather than an independent bureaucracy such as the de-centralized welfare structure of 
resource wealth distribution (i.e. the Nordic model). In other words, resources are in the hands of 
the royal families, who decide who should have how much access to it. Within the domestic 
economy that emerges around these ‘transnational rentier states’ and their welfare systems, 
therefore, it is not surprising that for young people, connections are more important than 
educational background in finding jobs. 
 Thus, the other aspect of the GCC’s governmental design of the educational system is the 
peculiar nature and objectives of the GCC welfare systems. Similar to the educational systems, 
the welfare systems have not been designed in such a manner that they would reduce the gaps 
among different social classes. At the same time, the life-style of the ruling elites and the wealthy 
exacerbate the sense of social injustice among lower classes. Thus the concept of poverty 
becomes a relational concept rather than a certain economic index that could be measured based 
on fixed mainstream parameters such as income or access to food and other life necessities. 
Accordingly, despite the unprecedented economic growth and despite the relatively positive 
economic indexes, the highly uneven economic statuses of different groups of citizens have 
created a cause for resentment. This resentment among the lower classes, in turn, has fueled 
various destructive forces ranging from socioeconomic corruption to radicalism. In particular, 
corruption has been a natural response in domestic economic systems where some are included 
in while others excluded from having access to the proceeds from shared natural resources.  
 
Labor Market 
 
It is important to note again, that the arrangements of social classes in the GCC countries 
are complicated. The arrangements become somewhat clearer when viewed as a transnationally-
oriented structure rather than the traditional nationally-oriented framework. The following chart 
produced by a journalist, Ahmed Al Omran, indicates that unusually high percentages of the 
population in the GCC countries consist of foreign workers.  
 
Chart 1: Percentage of Foreign Workers of Total Population in GCC in 2011 
Source: Adapted from Ahmed Al Omran, http://www.timeskuwait.com/Times_Kuwait-3rd-
highest-in-expats-numbers-in-GCC 
 The dependency of the private sector in most of the GCC countries on foreign workers 
has been dramatically increasing in the past few decades. Table 7 below provides the “net 
migration”3 to the GCC countries from 1980 to 2013.  
 
  
1980-
1983 
1984-
1988 
1989-
1993 
1994-
1998 
1999-
2003 
2004-
2008 
2009-
2013 
Bahrain 3195 12899 5480 44472 143336 293196 22081 
Kuwait 102745 118980 -601874 125523 200174 448950 299999 
Oman 81500 9000 65500 -209243 106793 32567 1029938 
Qatar 101975 57517 -22453 42840 170402 857088 499998 
Saudi Arabia 1391626 538413 -121511 -876891 2197524 157126 300000 
United Arab 
Emirates 174444 259505 327575 464455 863784 3812193 514042 
GCC 1855485 996314 -347283 -408844 3682013 5601120 2666058 
 
Table 7: Net Migration to the GCC Countries 
Source: World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator) 
 
 
Figure 2: Trend Line of Net Migration in the GCC Countries4 
Source: World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator) 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the trend line of net migration. Despite the increasing migration of 
foreign labors to the GCC countries, which has propelled the extraordinary economic 
development in the region, the living conditions of these labor forces have not improved. The 
                                                                 
3According to the World Bank: “Net migration is the net total of migrants during the period, that is, the total number 
of immigrants less the annual number of emigrants, including both citizens and noncitizens.  Data are five-years 
estimates.”  (See here: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.NETM?page=6) 
4  The numbers from 1 to 7 are representing the time periods in the previous chart; 1=1980-1983, 2=1984-1988, 
3=1989-1993, 4=1994-1998, 5=1999-2003, 6=2004-2008, 7=2009-2013. 
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 World Report 2014 by the Human Rights Watch reports many unacceptable living conditions 
that foreign labors have to endure in these countries, ranging from “unpaid wages”, “physical 
abuse”, “passport confiscation”, and “unsafe housing” to “exploitation” and “servitude” (World 
Report, 2014). Obviously, the extent of these problems differs from one country to another. 
However, the economic structures of all GCC countries depend on cheap labor: “[f]or 
transnational capital, working class immiseration is just another way to reduce cost margins as 
firms expand their cross-border investment” (Cox, 2012, P.15).  
Finally, population growth remains an important challenge for these countries –a 
challenge that can exacerbate the level of inequality in the future. In a project conducted by The 
Economist in 2010, it was estimated that the GCC countries will face 30% population growth 
until 2020 (The GCC in 2020, 2010, P.1). Such a rapid growth requires states to produce many 
more new jobs. As mentioned before, currently, considerable percentages of the GCC working 
class are immigrants [See Figure 3 below].  
  
Figure 3: “Labor Force by Sector and Origin, 1969-2009” 
Source: Adopted from; https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dp/2011/1101mcd.pdf, P.5 
 
Even if the GCC states will be successful in the extremely difficult task of creating so 
many new jobs, it is doubtful that these jobs will benefit the indigenous populations or whether 
 these populations would agree to fill the job positions. This is because the current labor politics 
in the GCC region favors transnational labor class -who are cheap and need not be protected by 
national regulations and policies. Moreover, the GCC societies have benefited, to various 
degrees, from social welfare systems and from low-skill foreign workers for so long. This will 
make it quite unlikely that the indigenous populations will compete with foreign workers for 
low-skill job openings. Therefore, the transnational structure of capital accumulation that is the 
essence of the GCC political economies is not provided for the local demands. For instance, in 
terms of job market, it cannot absorb the future population growth in a way in which they would 
have a standard level of living that their ancestors have had. 
 
Conclusion 
 
“My Grandfather rode a camel, my father rode a camel, I drive a Mercedes, my son 
drives a Land Rover, his son will drive a Land Rover, but his son will ride a camel” (the 
National UAE, 2010). 
Saying by Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum, the former vice president of UAE.  
 
The ascendance of transnational activities has derailed any organic political and 
socioeconomic structure in the Gulf States. In other words, the modern political economy of the 
GCC are dominated by transnational actors whose business activities are more compatible with 
the global structure of transnational capital accumulation rather than advancing any national (or 
regional) economic interests. 
This research aimed at shedding some light on several aspects of the political economy of 
the transnational elite in the GCC states. It is the promise of globalization that economic 
integration as well as cultural interactions can provide a ground for sustainable economic 
development. At the same time, many democratization studies tell us that enhancement of 
learning and education within societies is an important stepping-stone towards democratic 
changes. However, where the middle class and the working class are essentially excluded from 
the process of decision-making, and the economic interactions are micromanaged by the ruling 
elites, both of the above propositions are dubious. 
In the GCC region, these elites are well educated and successful in their transnational 
business activities. They speak the “language of the world” (i.e. West) and they share the 
“globalized [i.e. capitalist] mentality”. But, when it comes to the national and local levels of 
analysis, these elites, as loyal custodians of the interests of TCC, have to play the role of 
controllers and shock-absorbers vis-à-vis their societies. This in effect, has created a “race to the 
bottom” for further trans-nationalization of local economies combined with suppressive politics. 
What is missing, in the words of Robert Wade, is a “strategic management of [international] 
trade, so as to curb the race-to-the-bottom effects of export-led growth, and foster domestic 
industry and services that would provide better livelihood and incomes for the middle and 
working classes” (Wade, 2008, P.20). On the other hand, the image of transnational globalization 
in the region cannot be completely understood without examining the crucial role of the GCC-
based transnational elites; and this paper provides a glimpse into the unusual combination, in the 
GCC countries, of the low level of development in the infrastructure of the local economies on 
the one hand and the high level of development in transnational economic activities.  
 
 Another issue that was discussed in this paper was the relationship between the amount of 
wealth in this region and the authoritarian regimes. To understand this relationship, one should 
not focus only on domestic factors. The relationships between the GCC transnational elites and 
TCC have shaped the current domestic contexts for authoritarian regimes in important ways; and 
because the continuation of these regimes is in the interest of the transnational structure of 
capital accumulation, it is unlikely that any democratic change materializes in the foreseeable 
future. As the research explored, the GCC-based elites have been evolving from a 
national/international context to transnational context. Accordingly, any state-centric approach or 
state-society frameworks that are based upon the mainstream understanding of the notion of 
“state” cannot provide an accurate understanding of many fundamental processes in the GCC 
region.  
It is important to note that one of the recurring geostrategic aspects of the Persian Gulf 
region has been the emergence of political vacuums during various historical periods. In the 
early modern history of the Persian Gulf, this vacuum was filled by the British Empire.  After the 
British had to relinquish their power in the region, the U.S. filled the vacuum. In “Persian Gulf in 
History”, Gary Sick writes: 
 
“Throughout, U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf region were simple and consistent, 
conceived from the start in global, strategic terms: first, to ensure access by the 
industrialized world to the vast oil resources of the region; and second, to prevent any 
hostile power from acquiring political or military control over those resources.” (Potter,  
P.295, 2008). 
 
In the context of this political vacuum, the nature of the power that the GCC states have 
is unclear. Some scholars argue that energy resources that are available in the GCC region are 
the primary reason that the global economy should keep this region as stable as possible. On the 
other hand, the geostrategic location of the GCC region is a significant factor. While there are 
some truths in these assertions, the nature of state power in the GCC countries cannot be 
understood without contextualizing the GCC’s transnational elites in the TCC. It can be argued 
that, as the power of the TCC has dramatically increased in the past two decades in the GCC 
region, it has been the transnational structure of capital accumulation that has filled the political 
vacuum in that region. Accordingly, one cannot analyze the GCC states without the significant 
role of its transnational elites, who have created in the course of many decades a number of 
‘transnational rentier states’. These transnational rentier states have heavily influenced various 
aspects of the GCC countries’ institutional settings including the economic, political, social, and 
educational institutions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix 
 
Table 5.1: The Educational Background of Major Economic and Political Figures in the 
GCC 
 
 
NAME TITLE ORIGIN COMPANY INDUSTRY Education Other Occupations 
Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad bin 
Khalifa Al Thani
 Emir of the State of 
Qatar
Qatar
Sherborne School, Harrow School, Royal Military 
Academy Sandhurst (RMAS)
Abdullah bin Nasser bin 
Khalifa Al Thani 
Prime Minister of Qatar Durham Military College
Qaboos bin Said Al Said Sultan of Oman Royal Military Academy Sandhurstqab
Hamad bin Isa bin Salman Al 
Khalifa 
King of Bahrain Leys public school in Cambridge
Khalifa bin Zayed bin Sultan Al 
Nahyan 
President of the UAE Royal Military Academy Sandhurst
Mohammed bin Rashid Al 
Maktoum 
Prime Minister and Vice 
President of Dubai 
 Bell Educational Trust's English Language School
Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Bin 
Abdulaziz Alsaud
Chairman KSA
Kingdom 
Holding
Finance Menlo College, Syracuse University 
"Citigroup's largest individual 
shareholder" 
Sheikh Ahmed Bin Saeed Al 
Maktoum
Chairman UAE
Emirates/Emirat
es NBD
Transport University of Denver
"chairman of Dubai’s biggest bank, 
Emirates NBD, and of Dubai World, 
the conglomerate that includes the 
world’s third-biggest ports company, 
DP World".
Khalid Al Falih CEO and president KSA ARAMCO Industry Texas A&M University
"Member of American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers (ASME), the 
International Association for Energy 
Economics (IAEE) and Oxford Energy 
Policy Club" 
Ali Bin Ibrahim Al Naimi
Minister of Petroleum 
and Mineral Resources
KSA Energy
American University of Beirut, Lehigh University 
,Stanford University
Important role in oil supply 
decissions 
Mohammed Al Mady CEO KSA SABIC Industry
University of Colorado Boulder, The University of 
Wyoming, Honary Fellow of th London Business 
School 
"member of the U.S.-Saudi Business 
Council; the Economic Offset 
Committee; and the International 
Business Council of the World 
Economic Forum. Mr. Al-Mady is a 
fellow of the London Business 
School".
Mohamed Ali Alabbar Chairman and CEO UAE Emaar Real Estate Seattle University
World Economic Foroum (many times 
represted UAE). 
(http://thefinancialdaily.com/articles/
ViewArticleDetail.aspx?ArticleID=356
2)
Ahmad Al Sayed
Managing director and 
CEO
Qatar Qatar Holding Finance University of Boston, New York University
"Harrods, London Stock Exchange, 
Porsche and Hochstein are a few of 
the emblematic companies that come 
to mind under his stewardship".
Dr Fahad Al Mubarak Governor KSA SAMA Finance  University of Houston
"was previously chairman and 
managing director of Morgan Stanely 
Saudi Arabia" 
Mohamed Bin Issa Al Jaber Chairman & CEO KSA
MBI 
International
Real Estate
Honorary Doctor of Science degree from University 
of Westminster and City University
"is founder, Chairman and CEO of 
MBI Group, an international 
conglomerate which spans Europe 
and the Middle East. The Group is a 
worldwide investment institution 
operating in the hospitality, real 
estate, finance, oil and gas and food 
industries." 
  
 
 
 
NAME TITLE ORIGIN COMPANY INDUSTRY Education Other Occupations 
Bakr bin Ladin Chairman KSA
Bin Laden 
Group
Real Estate University of Miami
Lubna Olayan CEO KSA
Olayan 
Financing 
Company
Finance Cornell University,Indiana University
"A member of the International 
Business Council of the World 
Economic Forum, she is also on the 
Arab Business Council's executive 
committee"
Khaldoon Khalifa Al Mubarak
CEO and managing 
director
UAE Mubadala Finance  Tufts University, Boston, Massachusetts
"Member of International Advisory 
Board at Russian Direct Investment 
Fund, He has been a Director of 
Ferrari S.p.A,  the Chairman of 
Manchester City Football Club 
Limited" 
Sheikha Lubna Al Qasimi
Minister of Foreign 
Trade
UAE Government California State University
Abdul Aziz Al Ghurair CEO UAE Mashreq Finance
California Polytechnic State University (Honors 
Degree)
 
Mohammed Alshaya Chairman Kuwait
MH Alshaya 
Group
Retail wharton school of business
Sheikh Sulaiman bin Abdul-
Aziz Al-Rajhi
Chairman KSA Al-Rajhi Bank Finance
Akbar Al Baker CEO Qatar Qatar Airways Transport
"He has been a Non Executive 
Director of Heathrow Airport 
Holdings Ltd. since February 2013. 
He served as a Director of Cargolux 
Airlines International SA since 
September 8, 2011".
Mansour Saleh Al-Maiman Chairman KSA
National 
Commercial 
Bank
Finance University Of Dallas
Abdulla Nasser Al Suwaidi Director General UAE ADNOC Energy University of Wisconsin
Sheikh Khalid Bin Khalifa Al 
Thani
CEO Qatar Qatargas Energy Pacific Lutheran University
Thoraya Ahmed Obaid Shura Council Member KSA Government Wayne State University
Ali Shareef Al Emadi Group CEO Qatar
Qatar National 
Bank
Finance University of Arizona
Sheikh Saleh Kamel Chairman Chairman Dallah Albaraka Finance University of California 
"He serves as Chairman of Egyptian 
Saudi Finance Bank, Egypt; Al Amin 
Bank, Bahrain; Albaraka Bank 
Lebanon; Arab Media Company, 
Saudi Arabia and Arab Radio & 
Television, Cayman Islands". 
Hassan Abdullah Al Thawadi Secretary General Qatar
Qatar 2022 
Supreme 
Committee
Culture and 
Society
The University of Sheffield Director of Hassad Australia Pty Ltd. 
  
Sources: http://www.bbc.com, http://www.aawsat.net, http://encyclopedia.jrank.org/articles/pages/5492/Al-Bu-Sa-
id-Qaboos-1940.html, http://www.mofa.gov.bh, http://www.bloomberg.com, https://www.bellenglish.com, 
http://content.time.com, http://www.arabianbusiness.com, http://www.saudiaramco.com, http://gulfbusiness.com, 
http://www.kaust.edu.sa, http://thefinancialdaily.com, http://www.swfinstitute.org, http://www.reuters .com, 
http://www.mbialjaber.com, http://www.forbes.com, http://investing.businessweek.com, 
http://investing.businessweek.com, and personal websites of each elite. 
 
Table 6.1: Dubai Schools with Western Curricula 
NAME TITLE ORIGIN COMPANY INDUSTRY Education Other Occupations 
Mahmood Hashim Al Kooheji CEO Bahrain Mumtalakat Finance Staffordshire University, Henley Business School
"He serves on the International 
Advisory Board of Russian Direct 
Investment Fund".  
Sheikh Ahmed bin Jassim Al 
Thani
Director General Qatar Al Jazeera Media
Imperial College Business School, Tepper School of 
Business
Hayat Sindi Medical researcher KSA
Diagnostics for 
All
Science King's College London, University of Cambridge
"founded Sonoptix Technology in 
the UK with Saudi Arabian seed 
funding". 
Omar K Alghanim CEO Kuwait
Alghanim 
Industries
Industry New York University, Harvard Business School
 "He also serves as a Board Member 
of several firms including Kuwait 
China Investment Fund in India and 
China. He served as a Director of 
Kuwait China Investment Company 
K.S.C until March 2013". 
Abdullatif al-Othman Governor and Chairman KSA SAGIA Finance Massachusetts Institute of Technology
"Former Non-Executive Director of 
Petron Corporation". 
Sheikha Hanadi Bint Nasser 
Bin Khalid Al Thani
Businesswoman Qatar Finance London Business School, University Of London,
"She was named Young Global 
Leader by the World Economic 
Forum in 2005 and voted as 
personality of the year by Al Rayah; 
Qatar's leading newspaper, for her 
vision and contribution to the 
economy".
Mohammed Jameel President KSA
Abdul Latif 
Jameel Group
Retail Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Dr. Abdulrahman Al Zamil Chairman KSA
Al Zamil 
Holding 
Company
Industry University of Southern California
Bader M. Al Sa’ad Managing Director Kuwait
Kuwait 
Investment 
Authority
Finance Miami University
"Former Director of Kuwait Petroleum 
Corporation". 
Dr. Nasser Marafih CEO Qatar Qatar Telecom Telecoms George Washington University
" He played a key role in Qtel's 
acquisition of the Kuwait-based 
Wataniya in 2007, a strategic deal 
with AT&T to gain an equity stake in 
NavLink.He is a Member of the 
Geographic Information Service, the 
World Trade Organisation 
Committees and Institute of Electrical 
Electronics Engineers Inc". 
Dr. Khaled bin Abdulaziz Al 
Ghoneim
CEO KSA
STC - Saudi 
Telecom 
Company
Telecoms Carnegie Mellon University
Sultan Ahmed Bin Sulayem Chairman UAE DP World Industry Temple University
Dr. Sultan Al Jaber CEO and MD UAE Masdar Energy
Coventry University, California State University, 
University of Southern California 
Ala’a Eraiqat CEO UAE
Abu Dhabi 
Commercial 
Bank
Finance George Washington University
Mishal Kanoo Deputy chairman Bahrain Kanoo Group Industry
University of St. Thomas, Texas, American 
University
Sheikha Al Bahar CEO Kuwait
National Bank 
of Kuwait
Finance
 Harvard Business School, Stanford University and 
Duke University
Maha Khalid Al-Ghunaim
Chairperson and 
managing director
Kuwait GIH Finance San Francisco State University
Dr. Naif Al-Mutawa Founder and CEO Kuwait
Teshkeel Media 
Group
Culture and 
Society
Long Island University, Columbia University, Tufts 
University
  
 
School Name  Level Curriculum School Name  Level Curriculum
Al Ameen School  K-10 Arab, Islamic, UK Dubai American Scientific School  K-12 US
Al Andalus School Dubai  K-12 Arabic, US Dubai Arab American School  K-12 UAE/US
Al Diyafah High School  K-12 Indian, UK Dubai British School  K-12 UK
Al Ittihad Private School Jumeirah  K-12 Arabic, US Dubai British School Jumeirah Park  K-12 UK
Al Ittihad School Mamzar  K-12 Arabic, UAE, US Dubai Carmel School  K-12 Arabic, UK
Al Khaleej National School  K-12 Arabic, UAE, US Dubai College  secondary UK
Al Maaref Private School Dubai  K-12 Arabic, UAE, US Dubai English Speaking College  secondary UK
Al Mawakeb School  K-12 Arabic, US Dubai English Speaking School  primary UK
Al Mawakeb School Barsha  K-12 Arabic/US Dubai First School  K-12 UAE, US
Al Sadiq Islamic English School  K-12 Arabic, UK Dubai Gem School  K-12 Indian/UK
Al Salam Private School  K-10 Arabic/UK Dubai International Academy  K-12 UK/US
Al Worood School Dubai  primary Arabic, UK Dubai International School  K-12 Arabic, US
American Academy for Girls Dubai  K-12 US Dubai International School Nad Al Sheba  K-12 Arabic, US
American International School Dubai  K-12 Arabic, Canadian, US Dubai Modern Education School  K-12 UAE, US
American School of Dubai  K-12 US Dubai National School  K-12 UAE, US
Apple International School  primary Indian/UK Dubai National School Al Twar  K-12 UAE, US
Arab Unity School  K-12 Arabic, UK Dubai Scholars Private School  K-12 Indian/UK
Bradenton Academy Dubai  K-12 US Dubai School of Excellence  K-12 US
British Institute for Learning Development  K-10 UK Dubailand Taleem School  K-12 UK, US
British National Curriculum School  K-12 UK Dulwich College Dubai   UK
Cambridge High School Dubai  K-12 Arabic, UK DWC High School  secondary UAE, US
Cambridge International School Al Quoz  K-12 UK Ellesmere College Dubai  K-12 UK
Cambridge International School Dubai  K-12 UK Emirates International Autism Center   
Cambridge International School Dubailand  K-12 UK Emirates International School Jumeirah  K-12 UK, US
Cambridge International School Jumeirah Village  K-12 UK Emirates International School Meadows  K-12 UK
Canadian International School Dubai  K-12 Canadian English College Dubai  K-12 UK
Capital School Dubai  K-12 UK English Medium School Dubai  K-12 Arabic/UK
Choueifat Dubai  K-12 Choueifat, UK, US Foremarke Hall School Dubai  primary UK
Choueifat Dubai Green Community  K-12 Choueifat, UK, US French School Dubai   French
Collegiate American School  primary US GEMS FirstPoint School Dubai  K-12 UK
Community West First School Dubai  primary UK GEMS Metropole School Motor City  K-12 UK
Deans International School  K-12 US GEMS Wellington Academy Al Khail   UK
Deira International School  K-12 UK German International School Dubai  K-12 German
Deira Private School  primary UK Horizon College Dubai  secondary UK
DPS Academy Dubai  K-12 Indian Horizon School Dubai  primary UK
Dubai American Academy  K-12 US Jebel Ali Primary School  primary UK
  
 
Source: DubaiFAQs guide to Dubai 
 
 
 
 
 
School Name  Level Curriculum School Name  Level Curriculum
Jebel Ali School  secondary UK Raffles International School South Campus  K-10 UK, US
JESS Arabian Ranches  K-12 UK Raffles International School West Campus  K-12 UK, US
Jumeirah College  secondary UK Raffles World Academy  K-12 UK, US
Jumeirah English Speaking School  primary UK Rashid Primary School  primary Arabic/UK
Jumeirah International School   Rashid School for Boys  K-12 Arabic/UK
Jumeirah Primary City School  primary UK Regent International School  K-12 UK
Jumeirah Primary School  primary UK Repton School Dubai  K-12 UK
Juventus Soccer School Dubai   Italian Royal Dubai School  K-10 UK
K12 International Academy  K-12 US/Home School Safa British Academy  K-12 UK, International
Kalimati Speech and Communication Center   Arabic, English, French Safa Community School  K-12 UK
Kent College Dubai   UK Safa School  primary UK
Kings College Dubai  K-12 UK School of Modern Skills  K-10 Arabic / US
Kings School Al Barsha  K-12 UK School of Research Science  K-12 Arabic, UK
Kings School Dubai  primary UK Sharjah American School Dubai  K-12 Arabic/US
Kings School Nad Al Sheba  K-12 UK Sheffield School Dubai  K-12 UK
Latifa School for Girls  K-12 UAE, UK Silicon Oasis GEMS School  K-12 UK
Lycee Francais International Dubai  primary French Sobha International Academy Dubai  K-12 UK
Lycee Francais International Georges Pompidou  secondary French St Marys School Dubai  K-12 UK
Lycee Francais International Meydan  primary Arabic, English, French Star International School Al Twar  K-10 UK
Lycee Georges Pompidou Ecole primaire Dubai  primary French Star International School Jumeirah  primary UK
Lycee Libanais Francophone Prive  K-12 French Star International School Mirdiff  primary UK
Millfield School Dubai   UK Sultan Al Owais Public School   UAE
Mirdiff Private School  K-10 Arabic/US Swedish School in Dubai  K-12 Sweden
Modern Renaissance School  primary UK Swiss International School Dubai   Swiss
Modern School and Nursery  primary Indian/UK The City International School  K-12 Pakistan, UK
National Charity School Dubai  K-12 Arabic, UAE The Oasis School Dubai  K-12 UK
New Arab Unity School  K-12 Arabic, US The Universal Academy of Excellence  K-12 UK
Nibras International School  K-12 Arabic/US Universal American School  K-12 US
Nord Anglia International School Dubai   UK Victory Heights Primary School  primary UK
North American International School Dubai  K-12 Arabic, US Wellington Academy Dubai  K-12 UK
Omar Bin Al Khattab Model School  secondary UAE, Arabic Wellington College Dubai   UK
Ontario International Canadian School  K-12 Canadian, Ontario Wellington International School  K-12 UK
Oundle School Dubai  K-12 UK Wellington International School Palm Jumeirah  primary UK
Oxford School Dubai  K-12 Arabic, UK Wellington Primary School  primary UK
Pan American Academy Dubai  K-12 Canadian Westminster School Dubai  K-12 Arabic/UK
Pristine Private School  K-12 UK Winchester School Dubai  primary Indian / UK
Queen International School  K-12 Arabic/UK Winchester School Dubai Oud Metha   Indian / UK
Raffles International School  K-12 UK, US
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